Briefing material for SSHRC’s appearance at the Standing Committee on Science and Research

October 25th, 2023, 4:30-5:30pm ET

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Table of content

• Purpose
• Background
• Opening Remarks
• Responsive Lines
• Annex A—SRSR Committee Membership
  • Other Members
    • Liberal Party of Canada
    • Conservative Party of Canada
    • New Democratic Party

Purpose

On October 25th, representatives from SSHRC (Ted Hewitt, Valérie La Traverse, Valérie Laflamme), NSERC (Alejandro Adem, Manal Bahubeshi) and CIHR (Christian Baron) will appear before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Science and Research (SRSR), to deliver opening remarks and answer questions (see responsive lines) related to the committee’s study on:

• Use of Federal Government Research and Development Grants, Funds, and Contributions by Canadian Universities and Research Institutions in Partnerships with Entities Connected to the People’s Republic of China.

Background

The committee was formed in 2021 and its mandate includes, among other things, reviewing and reporting on all issues relating to science and research, including any reports of the Chief Science Advisor, and any other matter which the House refers to the standing committee.

Membership Changes

On April 25th, the Committee elected a new Chair, MP Lloyd Longfield, who replaced previous Chair, Hon. Kirsty Duncan. Recent additions to committee membership include the following new members (see Annex A for committee member biographies):

• Hon. Helena Jaczek (Liberal), former Minister for FedDev and for Public Services and Procurement Canada
• Hon. David Lametti (Liberal), former Minister of Justice and Attorney General
• Ryan Turnbull (Liberal), current Parliamentary Secretary to Minister Champagne
• Hon. Michelle Rempel Garner (Conservative)

The MPs no longer on the committee are: Dan Mazier (Conservative), Charles Sousa (Liberal), Chad Collins (Liberal) and Stéphane Lauzon (Liberal).

Current Work

• The study began on June 20, 2023, was on hold over the summer break, and resumed in September. There have been six meetings to date.
• Officials from CSIS and Public Safety appeared on October 23rd. Their opening remarks and responses to committee questions aligned with the briefing material below.
• Minister Champagne’s office is still negotiating a date for him to appear, most likely after the Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC) Policy announcement.

Previous witnesses for the study:

Name	Position/Organization	Representing
Chad Gaffield	CEO	U15
Philip Landon	Interim President & COO	Universities Canada
Jeffrey Stoff	President	Center for Research Security and Integrity
Anna Puglisi	Senior Fellow, Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology	(As an individual)
Margaret McCuaig-Johnston	Senior Fellow, University of Ottawa	(As an individual)
Benjamin Fung	Canada Research Chair and Professor, McGill University	Alliance Canada Hong Kong
Cherie Wong	Executive Director	Alliance Canada Hong Kong
Gordon Houlden	Professor and Director Emeritus	University of Alberta China Institute
Christian Leuprecht	Professor, Royal Military College	(As an individual)
Jim Hinton	Intellectual Property Lawyer	(As an individual)
Ivana Karaskova	China Projects Lead, Association for International Affairs	(As an individual)
Kevin Gamache	Assoc. Vice Chancellor and Chief Research Security Officer	Texas A and M University System Research Security Office
Nicole Giles	Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships	CSIS
René Ouellette	Director General, Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement	CSIS
Sami Khoury	Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security	CSE
Samantha McDonald	ADM, Innovative Business Strategy and Research Development	CSE
Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère	Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security	Public Safety
Lesley Soper	Director General, National Security Policy	Public Safety

Committee members focused on the following key themes during their questioning for this study:

• The idea of the federal government creating a foreign agency registry or list of problematic entities to track institutions of concern;
• Research areas that pose the greatest risks to Canada’s national security;
• When the government’s new policy on sensitive research areas and affiliations of concern will be published;
• The role of universities in acting on national security threats;
• The need for increased transparency by universities regarding their partnerships;
• Challenges in balancing academic openness, integrity, and international collaborations with security concerns;
• Punitive measures/enforcement that could be used to provide consequences to researchers and institutions partnering with entities of concern;
• Predatory presence of some companies on campuses, approaching researchers and students (“Feed, Trap, Kill”: explained here);
• Government support for Canadian research institutions on research security, including small institutions and colleges;
• Recommendations from witnesses on how various levels of government can help address these issues;
• International approaches by like-minded countries related to research security;
• Current state of interference by China on the Canadian research community;
• The need to increase research funding levels to bring Canada to OECD levels, and that better funding HQP would reduce research security risks as well.

Opening Remarks

Check against delivery

660 words/approx. 5.1 minutes @ 130 WPM

• Thank you, Mr. Chair.
• Science and research are more important than ever, as the economic, environmental, and social challenges we face are as serious as they are complex. Expanding knowledge across all disciplines is foundational to innovation and to finding solutions that will enhance health, combat climate change and drive economic and social prosperity.
• SSHRC plays a key role in Canada’s research ecosystem, as the federal agency that supports research and talent in the humanities and social sciences, and as the agency that administers a number of prestigious national programs – such as the Canada Research Chairs Program, the New Frontiers in Research Fund, among several others -- on behalf of the three federal research funding agencies.
• SSHRC recognizes the crucial need to protect Canadian research from risks such as theft, foreign interference, or the unwanted transfer of knowledge. We’ve been collaborating with government partners and consulting with the research community to develop and implement the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships. Following the February 2023 statement by the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Health, we are also contributing to the development of a new interdepartmental policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern.
• To help ensure the research community meets these requirements, last fiscal year we began providing $125 million over five years to Canadian institutions through the Research Support Fund to help them enhance research security. We also engage with the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group and others in the research community to provide tools, resources, and information sessions in collaboration with the federal government.
• Given growing geopolitical tensions and rivalries, it is imperative that Canadian researchers have the necessary tools and knowledge to safeguard their work.
• However, it is also important to point out that international collaborations – including with researchers and institutions based in China – remain vital to Canada’s research enterprise and provide a basis for science diplomacy.
• Researchers need to work together across disciplines, sectors, and borders to understand and respond to global challenges, whether it is a global pandemic or the climate crisis.
• It is crucial to maintain open channels of communication between scientific communities in times of crisis and to promote collaborations in other areas of mutual interest.
• For instance, SSHRC is currently funding a research partnership among scientists from Canada, China, Costa Rica, United States, Ghana, France and other countries aimed at feeding the future human population in a just and equitable way, while also achieving biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation goals.
• The challenges facing Canada and the world today are frequently interconnected problems. They require that we cooperate on shared priorities while remaining vigilant about potential risks and steadfast in our efforts to protect the integrity of our research system.
• This reality reinforces that the Government of Canada, the granting agencies, the Canadian Foundation for Innovation (CFI), and the research community at large must all work together on this shared responsibility.
• Indeed, the Canadian research community comprises a vast range of experts on national security issues, science and innovation policy, and international relations. This expertise could contribute to the Government of Canada’s research security efforts.
• It is also our shared responsibility to ensure security measures do not lead to discrimination against, or the profiling of, any member of the community – including on the basis of nationality.
• Mr. Chair, the granting agencies, CFI, and their federal partners will continue to work with the research community to implement research security measures. But my colleagues and I believe that it’s important that we continue to take an evidence-based approach and look at the broader implications.
• As stated in the House of Common’s unanimous motion in May 2021, we must affirm our “commitment to science, research and evidence-informed decision-making.”^{Footnote 1}
• In doing so, I am confident we can better protect Canada’s research ecosystem from security risks while continuing to foster international collaboration on areas of mutual interest. Thank you.

RESPONSIVE LINES

N.B. most of the anticipatory questions and answers below were developed by NSERC and were adapted for SSHRC and TIPS. In addition to being more efficient, it will ensure more consistent responses.

What is SSHRC doing to safeguard its science and research from theft and espionage?

• In 2022-23, SSHRC supported more than 4,800 graduate students and postdoctoral fellows directly through scholarships and fellowships, representing $125 million.
• SSHRC, like NSERC and CIHR, have a number of measures in place that aim to protect Canada’s national security interests while preserving a collaborative and open approach to research and discovery. These controls include policy requirements that have been issued by the federal government, for implementation by the granting agencies, as well as safeguards that we have developed internally.
• Over the past few years, we have supported the development and dissemination of general best practices and resources on research security, through the Safeguarding Your Research portal led by Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada. We are consistently engaged with our research community, to raise awareness of these best practices.
• Since July 2021, we have taken specific action to safeguard Canada’s research from national security risks related to research partnerships between academic researchers and private sector organizations, which can be an important vector of risk. This is the basis for the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, which have been implemented in NSERC’s Alliance program.
• We are working closely with our federal partners to support the expanded implementation of these Guidelines within funding opportunities that support projects with private sector partner organizations. In addition, we encourage all researchers and institutions to consult the Safeguarding Your Research portal and the Guidelines.
  • If pressed on what other programs they will apply to: The Guidelines have already been implemented in the Canada Biomedical Research Fund. This program was selected to be among the first to implement the Guidelines given that it will fund research involving private sector partner organizations in sensitive areas. The Guidelines will also be implemented in other programs that fund private sector partnerships in the future in a risk-informed manner.
• We are also supporting the delivery of commitments outlined in the 2022 Federal Budget.
• Additional funding is being delivered through the Research Support Fund, managed by SSHRC on behalf of the three granting agencies, to build capacity within postsecondary institutions to identify, assess and mitigate potential risks to research security.
• We are also engaging with federal partners to support the upcoming launch of the Research Security Centre at Public Safety Canada, which will provide advice, outreach, and tools to help Canada’s research community identify and mitigate research security risks.
• In February 2023, new measures were requested for the Government of Canada, wherein grant applicants whose proposed research will advance a sensitive research area will not be funded if any researchers working on the project are affiliated with a university, research institute, or laboratory connected to military, national defence, or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to Canada’s National Security.
• We have been closely engaged in the development of this new policy direction, alongside several departments and agencies across the Government of Canada. We have already notified our research community of these upcoming requirements and, once the new policy has been put in place, we will provide them with additional guidance on the appropriate compliance measures.

How are the granting agencies supporting research institutions to meet the research security requirements, especially small institutions and colleges?

• The Research Support Fund, administered at SSHRC on behalf of the three granting agencies, is awarding additional funding provided by Budget 2022 to build capacity within postsecondary institutions to identify, assess and mitigate potential risks to research security. For institutions that don’t receive support through the new funds, research security related expenses are allowable under the Research Support Fund.
• The granting agencies are also engaging with federal partners to help establish new tools and resources to support the research community. This includes working with the Research Security Centre at Public Safety Canada which is designed to provide advice to researchers and institutions, as well as contributing to the ongoing development of the Safeguarding Your Research portal and information sessions.

How is this new policy on sensitive research and affiliations of concern, different from the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships?

• While the Guidelines address risks regarding research partnerships with private sector partner organizations, the new measures requested by the Ministers will address risks related to researchers affiliated with universities, research institutes, and laboratories that are connected to military, national defence or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to our national security.
• This new policy direction is, therefore, designed to apply to the majority of our research grant funding programs.
• The National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships apply on a much narrower basis, since they are a specific tool designed to address risks related to partnerships between academic researchers and private sector organizations.

Why does SSHRC fund projects involving partners who may be subject to foreign government influence?

• SSHRC funding, like all granting agency funding, is awarded following competitive processes of independent merit review – managed at arm’s length from the government – designed to ensure the highest standards of excellence. The affiliations of partners organizations are not considered as part of the merit review process.
• With the roll-out of the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, applications to funding programs where the Guidelines will apply and that involve a private sector partner will be subject to a risk assessment that is separate from the merit review process.
• Applicants who identify a potential risk will also develop an appropriate risk mitigation plan. This mitigation plan must be implemented as a condition of funding, for the duration of the project.
• In cases where national security agencies determine that the risks to Canadian interests cannot be sufficiently mitigated, research funding will be declined.

How many funding applications where the Guidelines apply have been declined funding to date on the basis of national security risks?

• Defer to NSERC for their experience with the Alliance program.
• If pressed on the Canada Biomedical Research Fund: The risk assessment process is ongoing in the second stage Canada Biomedical Research Fund and will completed before funding decisions are made.

Has SSHRC previously funded research collaborations between Canadian researchers and Chinese military scientists or Russian scientists?

• SSHRC works in close collaboration with other government departments and agencies to ensure Canada’s research support system is as open as possible and secure as necessary. The science and research system is a global one, and as the global geopolitical context has shifted in recent years, so too has the way in which we engage with and guide the research community in Canada.
• For this reason, the granting agencies have committed to follow the federal government’s research security framework. This framework is country-agnostic, to ensure that the measures being implemented account for newly emerging threats that can originate from anywhere in the world.
• If pressed on country-agnostic approach:
  • The processes we apply are country-agnostic approach, to ensure they are responsive to the changing geopolitical environment and to ensure that they do not lead to racial discrimination or inequity within the research community.
  • It is critical that research security measures do not lead to discrimination against or profiling of any member of the research community on the basis of ethnic background.
• If pressed about Russia:
  • In March 2022, following the government statement outlining measures taken in response to the crisis in Ukraine, the federal granting agencies committed to refraining from entering into agreements with Russian research institutions; however there was no broad-based ban on collaborations with individual Russian researchers, in recognition of the historic role that many researchers have played in defending freedom from tyranny.
• Only if pressed on specific national security concerns:
  • SSHRC reserves the right to terminate or to place a hold on an award, if the Government of Canada determines that there is an unacceptable national security risk or if the grant recipient or co-recipient(s) are subject to criminal proceedings which are related to, or have an impact on, the research.

Does SSHRC still have active projects in partnership with Huawei Technologies Canada Co. Ltd?

• The grants funded by SSHRC, including tri-agency grants, can be active for a period of 1 to 7 years.
• There is one active grant that remains with Huawei Technologies Canada as a partner and it was awarded several years prior to the implementation of the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships in July 2021.
• If pressed for information: SSHRC can provide additional information in writing.

Will SSHRC consider a ban on partnerships with any company or country:

• Canada’s approach to research security, including the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, remain focused on mitigating threats regardless from where they emerge. For this reason, they remain country and company agnostic.
• Any new funding application that we receive and that is referred to national security risk assessment will be assessed as a new case, in the context of the research partnership project that is proposed.
• If pressed on companies or countries represented in applications denied funding:
  • SSHRC does not disclose information regarding applications that have not been funded.
  • As previously noted, the intent of the Guidelines is to ensure:
    • That the research partnerships funded by SSHRC are transparent and mutually beneficial to the researchers and their private sector partners, and
    • That appropriate risk mitigations are applied, wherever risks have been identified.

  What happens if a recipient of an SSHRC award is found to present a national security risk?

  • SSHRC reserves the right to defer or cancel any award:
    • If there is a determination by the Government of Canada of unacceptable national security risk related to the research, the award recipient or co-recipient(s), and/or the partner organization(s), where applicable.
    • If the award recipient or co-recipient(s) and/or partner organization(s), where applicable, are subject to criminal investigations, indictments, or convictions which are related to, or have an impact on, the research.
    If asked whether this has occurred: we have not been informed of any such determination of unacceptable national security risk.

  To your knowledge, is social sciences and humanities research an area we should be concerned about in terms of research security? Can you give me an example of where there might be cause for concern?

  • I want to first acknowledge that the granting agencies are working with Public Safety, CSIS and CSE, among other federal partners, to develop research security measures, and that we rely on their expertise and authority to define national security risks.
  • There are potential risks in the social sciences and humanities. The National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships provide examples of sensitive research areas that could pose security risks if subject to unwanted knowledge transfer. This includes research involving access to critical infrastructure, or the use of large sensitive datasets (e.g. financial or personal data). This is why applicants to SSHRC funding opportunities that will apply the Guidelines in the future will be asked to assess whether their research is sensitive and whether partner organizations may pose security risks to their research.
  • SSHRC also houses the Tri-agency Institutional Programs Secretariat which funds research in all areas and disciplines.
  • As we continue our implementation of the Guidelines and other research security measures, we expect to gain a better understanding of the patterns of risks associated with different areas of research.

  How do you balance addressing risks to research security, while continuing to promote open science and international collaboration?

  • Finding this balance is critical, since open and international research collaboration is indispensable to pushing the boundaries of innovation and addressing complex societal challenges.
  • Research security measures like the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships do not ask our research community to sacrifice openness or international collaboration for the sake of security. These objectives are not at odds with one another. We are only asking for extra due diligence, in our collective interest, to safeguard our research against security risks.
  • Canada’s Roadmap for Open Science and UNESCO’s Recommendation for Open Science both agree that open science needs to be practiced in full respect of privacy, security, ethical considerations, and appropriate intellectual property protection.
  • Canada and the UK have been co-leading a working group of the G7, to develop a set of Common Values and Principles on Research Security and Research Integrity, which were published recently.
    • Some of its principles include:
      • Funding for scientific and research partnerships should continue to be guided by scientific merit assessments and excellence and take appropriate and proportionate consideration and mitigation of risks to national and/or economic security where necessary.
      • Governments must work collaboratively with their research communities to address research security risks; and
      • Openness should be maintained to the maximum extent, acknowledging the need for safeguards for research that could have adverse ethical or national security implications.
  • Canada’s research security approach is also country and company agnostic, based on the recognition that threats evolve and can originate from anywhere in the world – this approach is outlined on the Safeguarding Your Research portal, which is Canada’s one-stop shop for all research security tools, resources, training courses, and more.

  How are other like-minded partners tackling the issue of research security?

  • The Government of Canada continues to engage with like-minded partners bilaterally and through multilateral forums, such as the G7 Working Group on the Security and Integrity of the Global Research Ecosystem which has published guiding principles. This enables Canada and its allies to share their respective experiences and best practices.
  • For example, the UK government released the Trusted Research Guidance which is designed to help academics and universities understand the risks and protect their research by managing international partnerships, cybersecurity and enhancing due diligence. The UK has established a Research Collaboration Advice Team, which advises research institutions on the national security risks linked to international research. This is similar to the Research Security Centre being established at Public Safety Canada.
  • In Germany, the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research was established to monitor research security developments, identify need for action, and advises the boards of German research funding organizations on these issues. If necessary, committee members will take part in public discussions. The Joint Committee published a set of recommendations on “Scientific Freedom and Scientific Responsibility” which provide research security considerations for researchers in terms of necessary risk analysis, measures for reducing risk, and evaluating the publication of research results. Research institutions are also encouraged to develop rules for ethically responsible research and the handling security-relevant research that go beyond compliance with legal regulations.

  What do you mean by science diplomacy?

  • Science diplomacy encompasses a range of different activities. For example, research collaborations can help build and maintain bridges between countries, even in cases when formal diplomatic channels are no longer functioning. These collaborations can be crucial to help restore diplomatic relations and to ensure that, despite geopolitical tensions, countries can continue to collaborate on important areas of shared interest such as addressing the climate and environmental crises.

  Does SSHRC monitor where students hold their awards?

  • Yes, the location of tenure for the award is recorded. Scholarships and fellowships are generally tenable at institutions whose standing is recognized by SSHRC.

  Who is eligible to hold a SSHRC scholarship or fellowship?

  • To be eligible for support from the majority of SSHRC’s scholarships and fellowships programs (except for Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarships and Banting Postdoctoral Fellowships), applicants must be a Canadian citizen, a permanent resident of Canada or a protected person under subsection 95(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. SSHRC may ask for proof of citizenship, residency or protected person status before and while providing funding.

  For any questions regarding the new policy and foreign students affiliated to institutions in China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia

  • The Government of Canada has a clear position, aligned with standards across the G7, that excluding any individual from participating in research on the basis of their citizenship or country of residence is not an acceptable measure to address risks to research security.
  • Freedom from discrimination is a fundamental and internationally recognized human right, and an equitable, diverse, and inclusive research environment is essential for the production of ground-breaking, high-quality research that generates impact.
  • Following the request of the Ministers on February 14th 2023, SSHRC is currently working in close collaboration with Government of Canada partners, including the national security departments and agencies as well as CIHR, NSERC, and the CFI, to develop clear guidance for the Canadian research community and to ensure that the grants we fund that would advance sensitive research areas do not involve individuals—including students—who have an ongoing affiliation with institutions connected to the military, national defence or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to Canada’s national security.
  • If pressed on past affiliations: The new guidance is still being developed. To respect procedural fairness and allow researchers time to understand and apply the new guidance, the focus will be on currently held affiliations.

  For any questions regarding foreign talent programs:

  • We are continually working with ISED and with Canada’s national security agencies, to develop our knowledge of research security risks and to ensure that we can provide up-to-date guidance on research security to the researchers we fund.
  • With regards to talent programs, we have developed and published a set of best practices on the Government of Canada’s Safeguarding Your Research portal. Specifically, that:
    • Researchers should not participate in foreign talent and/or recruitment programs without consent from their home institution and compliance with its policies.
    • Foreign funding received that may duplicate funds already allocated for the same research or teaching activities should be disclosed to the home institution and to the relevant funding agencies, in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment contracts and policies, and the relevant terms and conditions of any grants and awards.
  • We are aware of new research security measures taken by the US and other countries related to foreign sponsored talent programs and will continue to work with our federal partners to address any risks in a manner that is best adapted to the needs of Canada’s research environment.

  For any questions regarding the public appearance of Five-Eyes Intelligence chiefs, on October 17th, where CSIS Director David Vigneault said Western companies and universities need to be “clear-eyed” about how China is stealing technology and also trying to attract expertise and raw research from universities:

  • We have been working closely with Canada’s national security departments and agencies, including CSIS, to ensure that our collective approach to research security is responsive to the changing geopolitical environment.
  • We recognize the position of the Five-Eyes Intelligence chiefs, and will continue to engage with CSIS to coordinate our approaches and ensure that Canada’s research ecosystem is as open as possible, and as secure as necessary.

  Questions from SRSR in September, for which a written public brief is being prepared by SSHRC (and NSERC and CIHR):

  1. What controls does your institute have in place to limit risk exposure on issues such as influence, intellectual property theft, and potential espionage from the entities connected to the People’s Republic of China?
     • See previous responsive lines for the question “What is SSHRC doing to safeguard its science and research from theft and espionage?
  2. If applicable, what percentage of your institution’s operating budget is dependent on funding from entities connected to the People’s Republic of China, broken down by the following categories: Fund development / fundraising; Sponsored research revenue; other categories (i.e., scholarships, sponsored staff or studentships, etc.)
     • As a federal government agency, SSHRC’s operating budget receives no funding from foreign entities.
  3. If applicable, what percentage of your institution’s grants and contributions currently are supported by match funding from entities connected to the People’s Republic of China?
     • We are still finalizing this analysis and will provide a written brief as requested by the committee.
     • Our data shows that 0.1% of active SSHRC grants, not including tri-agency grants, are supported by funding from organizations based in the People’s Republic of China. This translates to 8 out of 6,346 active awards.
     • These cash contributions to active grants from organizations based in China amount to $1,530,347, which represents less than 0,1% of SSHRC’s total contributions during the span of the grants.
     • For your reference, below is NSERC’s response:
       • Our data shows that only 0.3% of active NSERC grants are supported by matching funding from known entities connected to the People’s Republic of China.
       • This translates to 48 total awards, out of 15, 780 active awards.
       • Of these 48 active awards, 47 were awarded prior to the implementation of the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships. The majority (43 of 47 awards) are already reaching their end point and will not be receiving further funding from NSERC. The remainder will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2024-2025.
       • One award was funded since July 2021, where a national security assessment had found that risks were low and appropriately mitigated.
  4. How could the government better support your institution in limiting risk exposure on issues such as influence, intellectual property theft, and potential espionage from the entities connected to the People’s Republic of China?
     • As a government organization, we continue to work collaboratively with other departments and agencies to ensure clear and timely communication of the information needed, and sufficient capital and human resource investment to limit risk exposure.

  ANNEX A—SRSR COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

  

  Lloyd Longfield (Guelph, ON) (LPC)
  Chair

  Background: Previously a Mechanical Engineering Technologist, MP Longfield has been serving Guelph for 30 years including 7 years as the President of the Guelph Chamber of Commerce before being elected to Parliament in 2015. He has since served as a member of the Standing Committee for Industry, Science and Technology, as a member of the Standing Committee for Agriculture and Agri-Food, as Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts and as a member of the Standing Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development.

  Interests: Environment, housing, mental health, Indigenous reconciliation, early learning, childcare, entrepreneurship and economic development

  

  Corey Tochor (Saskatoon – University, SK) (CPC)
  Vice-Chair

  Background: Elected as Member of Parliament in 2019. Key focus areas have been: government accountability, advancing Canada's energy independence, and fighting against Internet censorship. Mr. Tochor was previously elected to the Saskatchewan legislature in 2011 and 2016. Before entering politics, he was an entrepreneur who owned and operated Health Conveyance.

  Interests: Canadian nuclear energy; universities

  

  Maxime Blachette-Joncas (Rimouski-Neigette – Témiscouata – Les Basques, QC) (BQ)
  Vice-Chair

  Background: Obtained a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Quebec in Rimouski. He briefly held a job at the Business Development Bank of Canada, then was hired as deputy director general of the municipality of L'Isle-Verte. Work in the House of Commons has focused on Public Accounts and Tourism.

  Interests: Investments in R&D and biomanufacturing, support for French language research and publicationsnd biomanufacturing, support for French language research and publications

  Other Members

  Liberal Party of Canada

  

  Valerie Bradford (Kitchener South – Hespler, ON)

  Background: First elected in September 2021. Prior to entering politics, she was an economic development professional for the City of Kitchener.

  Interests: Opportunities/gaps in research funding, robotics, sustainable aviation, economic development

  

  Lena Metlege Diab (Halifax West, NS)

  Background: Nova Scotia’s first female Attorney General and Minister of Justice; served as Minister of Immigration, Minister of Labour and Advanced Education, et Ministre des Affaires acadiennes et de la Francophonie. She graduated from Saint Mary's University with a Bachelor of Arts in economics and political science. She also obtained her Master of Public Administration and Bachelor of Laws.

  Interests: Promoting advancements in science and research, EDI. Strong interest in science through her family (both children work in/study NSE)

  

  Hon. Helena Jaczek (Markham- Stouffville, ON) New Member

  Background: Previously served as Minister for FedDev and as Vice-Chair of Treasury Board. Before her work at the federal level, she was the Member of the Ontario Provincial Parliament in which she served as Ontario’s Minister of Health and Long-Term Care, Chair of Cabinet, Ontario’s Minister of Community and Social Services, and Vice-Chair of the Health, Education and Social Policy Cabinet Committee. Dr. Jaczek received her medical degree and Master of Health Sciences from the University of Toronto and a Master of Business Administration from York University. She spent many years in general practice on staff at Women’s College Hospital in Toronto. She served on the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (INDU). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Jaczek was invited to take part in the Standing Committee on Health.

  Interests: Healthcare, Health Data Collection, Individuals with Disabilities

  

  Hon. David Lametti (LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC) New Member

  Background: Served as Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada from 2019 to 2023. Received Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Civil Law degrees at McGill University. Lametti completed a Master of Laws degree from Yale Law and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in law from Oxford. He was previously a professor of Law at McGill University and later Associate Dean of McGill’s Law School. His work led to the creation of the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy, which he co-founded in 2003. In 2017, he served as parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development.

  

  Ryan Turnbull (Whitby, ON) New Member

  Serves as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry. Also a member of the INDU committee.

  Background: MP Turnbull has a master’s degree in philosophy. Previously Turnbull founded a management consulting company focused on social innovation and ethics targeting systemic problems like systemic poverty, racism, and gender equality.

  Interests: Social Services, Environment

  Conservative Party of Canada

  

  Gerald Soroka (Yellowhead, AB)

  Background: First elected in 2019. Prior to entering politics, served as Mayor of Yellowhead County. Served on the Standing Committee for COVID-19 Pandemic.

  Interests: Public safety, freedom of speech

  

  Ben Lobb (Huron-Bruce, ON)

  Background: MP Lobb holds a Bachelor of Science in business administration from Lee university in Cleveland, Tennessee. Ben currently serves as the shadow minister for digital government and special advisor to the leader of the opposition on blockchain technologies and crypto assets. Previously worked in finance for desire2lean (d2l), an online education platform.

  Interests: Blockchain technology

  

  Hon. Michelle Rempel Garner (Calgary Nose Hill, AB) New Member

  Background: MP Garner holds a degree in economics and previously worked at the University of Calgary as director of the Institutional Programs Division. She also worked in the technology commercialization division of the University of Manitoba, where she assisted in administering commercialization strategies for emerging technologies. In 2011 served as Minister of State for Western Economic Diversification. Michelle previously served as the Shadow Minister for Natural Resources, Shadow Minister for Health, Shadow Minister for Industry and Economic Development.

  Interests: Innovation and technology commercialization.

  New Democratic Party

  

  Richard Cannings (South Okanagan – West Kootenay)

  Background: Biologist specializing in birds; taught at the UBC for 17 years; current NDP Critic for Emergency Preparedness (Climate Adaptation), as well as Deputy Critic for Natural Resources and Deputy Critic for Innovation, Science and Industry; previously appointed NDP critic for Post-Secondary Education and Deputy Critic for Natural Resources. His father was also renowned environmentalist Stephen Cannings.

  Interests: student advocacy, Climate change, energy, oil and gas, fossil fuel subsidies, softwood lumber and forestry, natural resources